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Stealing our future as a people is one of the greatest crimes
the white man has ever devised. He justifies it with the fact
that the Indian is a "pagan," a believer in the preservation of
nature, a non-user of mineral resources, a non-destroyer of
the land and a family man... the white man has used pro-
gress as an excuse to conquer and own all, including the peo-
ple of other cultures. No one asks the Indian how he feels and
what he believes .... 1
Similar emotional refrains have been often repeated
regarding the treatment of Indian child welfare issues during
United States history. Although removal of any child from his
or her family is traumatic, too frequently Indian child removal
has been performed with little prior investigation and with an
absence of cultural sensitivity. The resulting inequalities in
Indian child foster placement and adoption rates led to a recog-
nition of the need for Indian child welfare reform, both on a fed-
eral and state level. This Article provides an overview of Indian
child welfare issues and addresses both the evolution and
nature of Indian child welfare reform. Initially, this Article dis-
cusses the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, including the cul-
tural history behind the Act, the scope of the Act, and the
resultant problems in the Act's drafting and application. Subse-
quently, this Article examines the history of Indian child wel-
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1. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs
of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1974)
[hereinafter Child Welfare Program Hearings] (statement of Ed Holves, Duluth,
Minnesota Youth Worker).
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fare legislation in Washington State, with a focus on
administrative proclamations and guidelines, and statutory
enactments.
II. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A FEDERAL SOLUTION
TO PROBLEMS IN INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
A. The Road to the Indian Child Welfare Act
The separation of Indian children from their families and
the subsequent placement of these children within a non-Indian
setting has occurred with alarming regularity in United States
history. During the late 1800s, thousands of Indian children
were forcibly sent to distant boarding schools for education and
training under the guise of civilizing and assimilating the
Indian child.2 Once removed from the perceived primitive and
harmful influence of their Indian families, these Indian chil-
dren could allegedly be transformed into productive members of
the dominant white culture.' Such distant education was
deemed "the medium through which the rising generation of
Indians are to be brought into fraternal and harmonious rela-
tionship with their white fellow-citizens."4
This assimilation required strict discipline. Indian chil-
dren were harshly treated, punished for speaking their own lan-
guage, and consistently instructed to purge themselves of all
traces of Indian culture.' While a few of these children assimi-
lated into the dominant non-Indian culture, most either died or
returned to their prior Indian homes, misfits in both white and
Indian society.6
2. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 238 (1970).
3. Id. at 180.
4. Thomas J. Morgan, Supplemental Report on Indian Education, December 1,
1889, in DocUMENTs OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 175, 178 (Francis Paul Prucha
ed., 1990).
5. Id. at 179; see also FRANcIs PAUL PRucHA, THE GREAT FATHER 234-37 (1984);
Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the United States: Indoctrination for
Subordination and Colonialism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE,
COLONIZATION AND RESISTANCE 371, 380-83 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992); Richard H.
Pratt, Remarks on Indian Education, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN 80, 82-84
(1893), reprinted in AMERICANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS, at 279 (Francis Paul
Prucha ed., 1975) ("It is only the Indian in them that ought to be killed....").
6. DEBO, supra note 2, at 240; Noriega, supra note 5, at 380; see also T. Sasaki,
Sources of Mental Stress, in INDIAN ACCULTURATION. EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INDIAN
STUDENTs IN BOARDING SCHOOLS AND RELATED PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 5 (J. Cobb ed., 1960)
("Rapid change from the Indian way of life may leave the Indian with the problem of
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Even more intrusive than this forcible boarding school edu-
cation, however, was the frequent placement of Indian children
in non-Indian adoptive families or foster homes. The motives
for this widespread separation of Indian children from their
families fall into three overlapping categories.
First, racial or cultural prejudice may have caused courts or
social workers to believe that a white-looking Indian child
would be better off with a white adoptive family. In terminat-
ing the parental rights of an Indian woman without a finding of
unfitness one state court noted, "[The] child has physical fea-
tures ... of a non-Indian nature and her return to an environ-
ment consisting primarily of Indian people would subject her to
being reared under unnatural conditions that would be detri-
mental and would endanger her emotional well being."7
Welfare or social workers who personally disapproved of
the child's family situation often removed Indian children.' In
the majority of cases, the removal of Indian children was based
upon an unfavorable welfare or social worker judgment of either
Indian behavior or the home environment by white standards.9
For example, many Indian cultures followed an extended family
concept with children cared for by many different adults in the
community. 10 On the Colville Reservation "[there is no such
thing... as an abandoned child because even if you are a 1/8
cousin, if that child is left alone, that's like your brother or sis-
ter, or your son or your daughter."" Such extended family rear-
ing, however, was often deemed abandonment by white social
workers. 12 These children were thus at high risk for familial
removal.
Second, religious values and beliefs often promoted adop-
tion and foster placement of Indian children in white homes.
Historically, for example, Mormon couples have been especially
being confused as to which set of rules to live by. The difficulty of making decisions in
this situation may result in emotional problems ....").
7. 124 CONG. REc. 38,101 (1978) (statement of Congressman Udall).
8. Child Welfare Program Hearings, supra note 1, at 4-9 (testimony of William
Byler, Executive Director, Association of American Indian Affairs).
9. Id.
10. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, WASHINGTON STATE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE MANUAL ch. 1.20 (1991) [hereinafter INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL].
11. Child Welfare Program Hearings, supra note 1, at 225 (testimony of Mel
Tonasket, President, National Congress of American Indians).
12. Id. at 484 (letter by Carolyn L. Attneave, President, Psychiatric Outpatient
Centers of America); see also H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-A.N. 7530, 7532-42.
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adamant in their attempts to save Indian children from the per-
ceived primitive and degenerate conditions found within the
Indian community."3 Such removals were often deemed a reli-
gious duty based on scriptures that dictated that Indians have
been cursed with dark skin by God because of their ancient
wickedness and moral turpitude.1 4
Finally, because Indian children are often entitled to non-
taxable payments and annuities from tribal funds, adoption and
foster care placement may be motivated by the prospect of
financial gain. Under 25 C.F.R. § 115.4, individual Indian mon-
eys in a minor's account may be distributed "in such amounts
deemed necessary in the best interests of the minor for the
minor's support, health, education, or welfare to parents, legal
guardians, fiduciaries, or to persons having control and custody
of the minor under plans approved by the Secretary. " 15 When
adoptive parents become aware that the Indian child has money
available through such an individual Indian account, they can
easily exert control over the funds.16 The rate of non-Indian
people applying for Indian foster or adoptive placements rises
dramatically when an Indian claims settlement is present.'
7
Financial motives thus could encourage cross-cultural adop-
tions or foster placements of Indian children in non-Indian
homes.
These three factors have contributed to the highly dispro-
portionate removal and adoption rates for Indian children.
Surveys conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the
Association on American Indian Affairs graphically demon-
strate the disparity between Indian and non-Indian children in
foster home and adoptive placement.' 8  In Washington, for
example, there were nineteen times as many Indian children as
non-Indian children in adoptive homes, and Indian children
were placed in foster care at a rate almost ten times higher than
13. See Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 431 (1977) [hereinafter Child Welfare
Act Hearings] (material submitted by the Church of the Latter Day Saints); see also
John Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child Welfare
Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 451, 456 (1989).
14. REX WYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND 149-50 (1982).
15. 25 C.F.R. § 115.4 (1992).
16. Child Welfare Program Hearings, supra note 1, at 118 (testimony of Melvin R.
Sampson, Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, Councilman, Yakima Indian Nation).
17. Id. at 5 (testimony of William Byler).
18. Id. at 72-94.
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that of non-Indian children.19 While this extreme disparity
may have lessened in recent years, a 1988 study revealed that
the national familial removal rate, for either foster or adoptive
care, is 3.6 times higher for Indian than for non-Indian
children.20
The displacement of Indian children from their birth fami-
lies frequently results in severe emotional and psychological
damage to the child. Although there are few psychiatric
problems in cross-culturally placed grade school children, social
problems begin to arise at adolescence. 21 There is much clinical
evidence to suggest that Indian children raised in off-reserva-
tion, non-Indian homes are at severe developmental and emo-
tional risk during their later development.22 While these
children are often cared for by well-intentioned and devoted fos-
ter or adoptive parents during adolescence, such children are
subject to "ethnic confusion and a pervasive sense of abandon-
ment."23 These cross-culturally raised children try to assume a
cultural identity.
Because of their racial characteristics, the majority of society
refuses to let them express that majority cultural identity
19. Id. at 89-90.
20. Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
Protecting Essential Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 131 (1984) (citing H.
MARGARET PLANTz ET AL., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE: A STATUS REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND
SECTION 428 OF THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1980 2-3 (1988)
(prepared for the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families, United States
Dept. of Health & Human Services)).
21. Child Welfare Program Hearings, supra note 1, at 49 (testimony of Dr. Joseph
Westermeyer, Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Minnesota). Not all theorists agree
with this conclusion, however. For example, a 1960s national comparison study of
Indian youth concluded that the great majority of those examined possessed normal
adolescent levels of self-concept and self-esteem. ESTELLE: FUCHS & ROBERT J.
HAViGHURST, To LIVE ON THIS EARTH 130-32 (1972). The study did indicate, however,
that if Indian adolescents come into contact with expectations of dominant white
culture teachers or other individuals, their self-esteem may drop. Id. at 131.
22. Child Welfare Act Hearings, supra note 13, at 110 (testimony of Dr. Carl
Mindell, child psychiatrist, and Dr. Alan Gurwitt, Associate Clinical Professor of Child
Psychiatry, Dept. of Psychiatry, Albany Medical College, American Academy of Child
Psychiatry). However, Indian children raised in Indian homes may face a similar risk.
See CuNicAL STUDIES IN CuLxuas CoNIucr (G. Seward ed., 1958), cited it JomN F.
BRYDE, THE INDIAN STUDENT 13 (1970) ([Ifn the case of submerged subcultures which
fail to give their members a rationale for positive identification, there will be few inner
resources with which to combat the unmitigated threat from without. Individuals
reared in such subcultures can hardly escape ambivalence in their self concepts.").
23. Child Welfare Act Hearings, supra note 13, at 114; see also NATIONAL AMERICAN
INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSN.: INDIAN FAMILY LAw AND CHILD WELFARE: A TExT 72-73
(1981).
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and they're forced into an identity which they really don't
know how to behave in. They really don't know how to act as
Indians should .... As a result, such individuals have low
cultural identity and tend to possess both poor coping skills
and significant social problems, such as high alcoholism and
suicide rates. 2
Furthermore, Indian children raised in a non-Indian envi-
ronment are usually denied knowledge of Indian cultural tradi-
tions. The opportunities for the Indian culture to survive are
significantly reduced if Indian children, the only real means for
the transmission of the tribal heritage, are raised in non-
Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their people.2"
If Indian culture is to survive, it is essential that the tribe's cul-
tural attributes are passed on to its children.
B. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: An Overview
Against this alarmingly high backdrop of cross-cultural
Indian child foster home and adoptive placements, Congress
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978.26 In this
document, Congress formally recognized a national policy to
protect the best interest of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal
of Indian children from their families and the placement of
such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect
the unique values of Indian culture.
2 7
24. Child Welfare Program Hearings, supra note 1, at 47-49 (testimony of Joseph
Westermeyer, Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Minnesota); see also id. at 27-29
(testimony of William Byler); John F. Shore & Spero Manson, Cross Cultural Studies of
Depression Among American Indians and Alaska Natives, 2 WHrrE CLOuD J. 5-12 (1981)
(reporting high rates of depression among American Indians). While some studies
indicate practically no difference between Indian and non-Indian general suicide rates,
these same studies often report a disparity in suicide rates for males at adolescence.
See FucHs & HAVIHURST, supra note 21, at 152 ("[The] suicide rate from age fifteen to
nineteen is about four times as high in Indian as for non-Indian young people.") These
studies often correlate high Indian suicide rates with "disorganized family life,
alcoholism, and loss of friends and relatives by death." Id. at 154. Significant tribal
differences in suicide rates exist, however. Generalizations concerning an "American
Indian suicide phenomenon" should thus be avoided. See James H. Shore, American
Indian Suicide-Fact and Fantasy, 38 PSYCHIATRY 86-91 (1975).
25. Child Welfare Act Hearings, supra note 13, at 157 (statement of Calvin Isaac,
Tribal Chief of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, representing National Tribal
Chairmen's Association); see also Mack T. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A
Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARiz. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1979).
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
27. Id. § 1902.
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The ICWA is remedial in nature and seeks to preserve Indian
culture by limiting state jurisdiction while expanding tribal
authority over Indian child adoptive and foster home place-
ments. To further these policy goals, the ICWA requires state
courts to follow specific guidelines when hearing an Indian child
placement case. In general, these procedures can be summa-
rized as follows:
(1) Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who
resides or is domiciled on the reservation.2 8 If the
Indian child resides off of the reservation, the tribal
and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, but the
Act evinces a preference for tribal court jurisdiction.29
(2) Notice must be given to the parent or Indian custo-
dian and the Indian child's tribe before any state court
involuntary custody proceeding. 0
(3) A state court must transfer Indian child custody
cases to a tribal court on the petition of either parent,
the Indian custodian, or the Indian child's tribe in the
absence of good cause to the contrary or an objection by
either parent.3 '
(4) If the case is held in state court, foster care place-
ment can be imposed only on a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that failure to remove the Indian
child from his or her current environment is likely to
result in serious physical or emotional damage to the
child.32 State court termination of parental rights
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that failure
to do so will result in serious physical or emotional
harm to the child.3
(5) Voluntary termination of parental rights by an
Indian parent or custodian requires court certification
that the consenting parent or custodian fully under-
stood the method and consequences of the termination
procedure.3 4 The parent or custodian can withdraw
28. Id. § 1911(a).
29. Id. § 1911(b).
30. Id. § 1912(a).
31. Id. § 1912(e).
32. Id. § 1912(b).
33. Id. § 1912(f).
34. Id. § 1913(a).
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this consent at any time, and the child will be returned
to him or her. 5
(6) If parental rights are terminated, a state court
must give preference, in the absence of good cause to
the contrary, to a placement with a) a member of the
child's extended family, b) other members of the Indian
child's tribe, and c) other Indian families.36 If a child is
accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement, the
child must be placed within a reasonable proximity to
the child's home in the least restrictive setting that
most approximates a family.3 v
(7) If any custodial provisions of the ICWA are violated
during a state court proceeding, the child's placement
may be invalidated upon petition by the child's par-
ents, Indian custodian, or tribe.38
A two-pronged path exists at the beginning of any adoptive
or foster care placement. If the ICWA applies, its provisions
and any additional protective state measures must be strictly
followed by the states. 9
However, if the state court deems the ICWA inapplicable,
the state's general adoptive or foster custodial procedures are
followed.4 ° If the child is indeed Indian, however, tribal notice
and participation in the custody proceedings is stymied.41 Even
if the tribe is aware of the foster or adoptive placement action,
35. Id. § 1913(b).
36. Id. § 1915(a).
37. Id. § 1915(b).
38. Id. § 1914.
39. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.240-.250 (1992); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 388-70-093, 388-73-044 (1992).
40. See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.050-.080, 26.33 (1992). Some courts
have held the ICWA inapplicable when Indian children were not being removed from
existing Indian environments. See In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1072 (1988). But see In re S.B.R., 43 Wash. App. 622, 626, 719 P.2d 154, 156
(construing the ICWA to apply when an Indian child was living with non-Indian
grandparents), review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1009 (1986).
41. Social workers and placement personnel frequently have difficulty identifying a
child as Indian. See, e.g., JEAN JAMES ET AL., ADMINISTRATrIVE REVIEW OF (WASHINGTON
STATE) REGION ONE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, OUTSIDE INVESTIGATION REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES 7-8 (1990) [hereinafter
REVIEW OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES] (on file with The University of Puget Sound Law
Review). Subject matter jurisdiction, however, can be raised at anytime. Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Although time consuming, tribes
may raise subject matter jurisdiction in an appeal of the initial decision holding the
ICWA inapplicable.
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the mandatory transfer provisions42 of the Act have no force
when the ICWA is initially deemed inapplicable.43 A state court
may thus refuse to transfer jurisdiction of the case to the tribal
court. 4 These actions greatly undercut "the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families" and act in opposition to
the stated Congressional policy and purpose behind the ICWA.4 5
C. Analysis of ICWA Provisions
1. Initial Inquiries: Does the ICWA Apply?
The ICWA applies to an Indian child custody proceeding
only if two conditions are met. First, the action must fit within
the ICWA definition of a child custody proceeding.46 Under the
Act, a child custody proceeding encompasses both voluntary
47
and involuntary foster care placement, 48 preadoptive place-
ment 49 and adoptive placement,50 and any other action result-
ing in the termination of parental rights.51 The Act specifically
excludes juvenile delinquency and divorce custody actions from
its coverage.
52
While the Act does not cover spousal custody actions, this
omission does not always apply to other types of intrafamilial
custody disputes. In In re S.B.R. 53 for example, the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals held that a permanent custody proceeding
involving an Indian father and non-Indian grandparents is an
"involuntary foster care placement" and is subject to the ICWA's
mandates.54
Second, the Act only applies if the custody proceeding
involves an Indian child. The ICWA defines an "Indian child" as
"any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
43. See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
46. Id. § 1903(1).
47. Id. § 1913.





53. 43 Wash. App. 622, 719 P.2d 154, review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1009 (1986).
54. Id. at 626, 719 P.2d at 156; see also A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska
1982) (holding that the ICWA does apply to intra-family custody disputes), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 914 (1983). But see In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980) (holding that
the ICWA does not apply to custody disputes between a natural mother and the
grandparents of an Indian child).
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(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe."55
The ICWA is not applied unless there is proof that the child
is at least eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.56 The
Act's definition of "Indian tribe," however, is narrow and only
encompasses "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized
group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the
services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their
status as Indians."57
Thus, an Indian child belonging to a tribe not eligible for
services from the Secretary of the Interior does not qualify as an
Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA.-8 The burden of
proof as to tribal eligibility is generally on the person claiming
tribal membership for ICWA purposes. 59
In addition to creating ambiguous situations involving non-
federally recognized tribes, the initial ICWA requirement that a
child be Indian within the meaning of the Act creates difficul-
ties on several levels.6 0 For example, although the Act requires
tribal membership eligibility, it fails to define who shall deter-
mine such eligibility. It is left to the courts or local legislatures
to set procedural guidelines for determining tribal membership.
Such a task could lead to inconsistent determination standards
among jurisdictions.6" In most states, a tribal determination of
eligibility is conclusive." However, the Act does not prevent
state courts from independently evaluating the tribal member-
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
56. Id.; see also In re Smith, 46 Wash. App. 647, 650, 731 P.2d 1149, 1153, review
denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1006 (1987).
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1988) (emphasis added).
58. See In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627, 632 (Vt. 1989).
59. In re Stiarwalt, 546 N.E.2d 44, 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 550
N.E.2d 564 (Ill. 1990).
60. Congress' power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes under the
Commerce Clause includes the authority to decide when and to what extent it shall
recognize a particular Indian community as a dependent tribe under its guardianship.
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). Nonfederally recognized tribes are
tribes that federal administrators have concluded are not eligible for most "special
Indian benefit." DAvm H. Gwwm~s, C -zs AN MAzmIALs IN lbImu LAw 5 (1979).
61. The ICWA authorizes both the implementation of more stringent state
standards and state or tribal agreements on the care and custody of Indian children. 25
U.S.C. §§ 1919(2), 1921 (1988).
62. See generally In re A.E., 749 P.2d 450, 452 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); In re J.C.M.,
451 N.W.2d 377, 387 (Neb. 1990); In re Angus, 655 P.2d 208, 212 (Or. Ct. App. 1982),
review denied, 660 P.2d 683 (Or.), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983); In re Smith, 46
Wash. App. 647, 650, 731 P.2d 1149, 1153, review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1006 (1987).
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ship requirements and determining whether the child is eligible
for tribal membership.63
In practice, the Act's ambiguous definition of Indian child
permits discretionary narrow construction by local agencies and
courts.64 As a result, ICWA mandates are often circumvented
by the very organizations responsible for their enforcement. In
Washington, for example, caseworkers' failure to identify
Indian children has been such a serious problem that "it's not
unusual for a child to be 'discovered' as Indian several years
after placement."65  Clearly, more stringent local court or
administrative guidelines are necessary to avoid undermining
the policy and purposes behind the ICWA.66 These guidelines
could take many forms but should, at a minimum, involve an
affirmative duty to investigate tribal eligibility.
2. Jurisdictional Provisions
Once a court ascertains that the ICWA applies to a given
Indian child custody case, the court must determine whether it
has jurisdiction over the action. Under the Act, tribal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children domiciled or
residing on the reservation.67
Although the ICWA utilizes a domicile concept for determi-
nation of tribal jurisdiction, the Act fails to define "domicile."
This omission led to a spate of litigation in which state courts
applied their own definition of domicile to determine where
jurisdiction vested.6
In 1988, the Supreme Court squarely faced this ICWA defi-
nitional gap in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield.69 Holyfield involved the status of twin infants, born
off the reservation and out of wedlock to a Choctaw mother.
The mother and the biological father wished to place the chil-
dren with a white couple and attempted to avoid tribal author-
63. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 20, at 165.
64. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 39 (1989)
(involving trial court refusal to apply ICWA because Indian child was born outside the
reservation); REVIEW OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, supra note 41, at 4-5.
65. REVIEW OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, supra note 41, at 7-8.
66. See, e.g., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANuAL, supra note 10.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 19 11(a) (1988). However, tribal jurisdiction is not absolute. Other
preexisting federal laws may divest tribal courts of all civil jurisdiction in Indian child
custody actions. See id. § 1360 (involving district court jurisdiction in actions where
Indians are parties).
68. See, e.g., Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 20, at 151-56.
69. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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ity while executing consents to adoption with the Mississippi
State Court. After the formal adoption decree was entered, the
Choctaw tribe moved to vacate the decree on the grounds that
the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction under the ICWA. v°
Nonetheless, both the trial court and the state supreme court
validated the state's exercise of jurisdiction based on the chil-
drens' lack of physical presence within the reservation
boundaries. 7 '
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
reversed the Mississippi court's ruling.72 Emphasizing well
known canons of construction, the need for uniformity, and the
Congressional policy behind the ICWA, the Court concluded
that it was "beyond dispute that Congress intended a uniform
federal law for the ICWA."7 3 The Court noted that under com-
mon law the domicile of an illegitimate child is that of its
mother.7 4 Because the mother was at all times domiciled on the
Choctaw reservation, the childrens' domicile was there as
well. 75 Thus the ICWA requirement of exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion applied, and the state court adoption decree was vacated.76
By defining domicile under the ICWA according to uniform
federal standards, the Court affirmed the ICWA's strong policy
of safeguarding the tribal role in Indian child custody proceed-
ings. In so doing, the Holyfield decision strengthened the scope
of tribal court jurisdiction over reservation domiciliaries or
residents.
The ICWA also evinces a preference for tribal court jurisdic-
tion over Indian children who are not residents or domiciliaries
of a reservation. Where an Indian child resides off the reserva-
tion, the tribal courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion.77 The state court may exercise original jurisdiction, but
absent objection of either parent, the state court must transfer
the case to a tribal court on petition of either parent, an Indian
custodian, or the child's tribe.7v
70. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988).
71. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 39-40 (1989).
72. Id. at 38-39.
73. Id. at 44-47.
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 49. Under common law, domicile requires both physical presence and an
intent to remain indefinitely. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICTS OF LAw §§ 15-16, 18
(1971).
76. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53.
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
78. Id.
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A petition for the transfer to a tribal court may be rejected
for "good cause."79 Although good cause is not explicitly defined
in the Act, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has promulgated
guidelines clarifying this term. 0 While not intended to have
binding legislative effect, the guidelines represent the BIA's
interpretation of the Act and are useful in interpreting the
ICWA. 8 ' Under these guidelines, good cause not to transfer an
Indian child custody proceeding exists in the following
circumstances:
(1) The Indian child's tribe does not have a tribal
court, as defined by § 103(12) of the Act, to which the
case can be transferred;
8 2
(2) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when the
petition to transfer was received, and the petitioner did
not file the petition promptly after receiving notice of
the hearing;
8 3
(3) The Indian child is over twelve years of age and
objects to the transfer;
8 4
(4) The evidence necessary to decide the case could not
be adequately presented in tribal court without undue
hardship to the parties or the witnesses;
8 5
(5) The parents of a child over five years of age are not
available and the child has had little or no contact with
the child's tribe or members of the child's tribe.86
In total, these BIA-suggested criteria combine the transfer deci-
sion with forum non conveniens concerns.8 7 Indeed, the legisla-
tive history behind section 111(b), the Act's transfer provision,
indicates that the Act's passage was intended to permit a state
court to apply "a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens, in
appropriate cases, to insure that the rights of the child as an
79. Id.
80. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (1979).
81. Id.; see also In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 172 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that the BIA guidelines are a useful aid in interpreting the ICWA).
82. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,591 (1979).
83. Id.; see also Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. at 172; In re Wayne R.N., 757 P.2d 1333,
1335-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a transfer was not required when a request
to transfer was made on the morning of trial and service had taken place six months
earlier).
84. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (1979).
85. Id.; see also In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 82 (Mont. 1990) (finding good cause not to
transfer when transfer would cause undue hardship on parties and witnesses), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2013 (1991).
86. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,591 (1979).
87. Id.
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Indian, the Indian parents or custodian and the tribe are fully
protected." 8
8
Thus, state courts are given some leeway to use a forum
non conveniens doctrine to decline jurisdictional transfers by
finding that justice is better served through state court jurisdic-
tion.8 9 Socioeconomic conditions and the perceived adequacy of
tribal or BIA social or judicial services may not, however, be
used in weighing whether good cause to transfer exists.90 In
addition, the burden of establishing good cause to resist juris-
dictional transfer rests with the party opposing such transfer.91
Although the allocation of the burden of proof and the gen-
eral policy behind the ICWA favor tribal jurisdiction, some com-
mentators have nonetheless suggested that, in reality, a
transfer request is far more likely to be denied than approved.2
At a minimum, state and federal agencies should solicit sugges-
tions from various tribes regarding methods to increase tribal
participation in jurisdictional transfer decisions. Such outreach
to various tribes would not only facilitate communication
between affected tribes and the relevant agencies, but the out-
reach would also provide much needed, culturally sensitive
ideas regarding the promotion of tribal court jurisdiction. State
and federal efforts made in this area would also facilitate the
ICWA's central policy of promoting tribal stability and
security. 9 3
3. Notice and Intervention Provisions
a. Notice Requirements
To preserve tribal security and stability, the Act requires
parental and tribal notice whenever a state court "knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved" in an involun-
tary state court custody proceeding.14 In general, a state court
has reason to believe that a child involved in an involuntary
child custody proceeding is Indian under the following
circumstances:
88. H.R. REP. No. 1386,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7544.
89. See generally Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 20, at 157.
90. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,591 (1979).
91. Id.
92. Hollinger, supra note 13, at 489.
93. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
94. Id. § 1912(a).
[Vol. 17:101
1993] Indian Child Welfare Law 115
(i) Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or
public or private agency informs the court that the child is an
Indian.
(ii) Any public or state-licensed agency involved in child pro-
tection services or family support has discovered information
which suggests that the child is an Indian child.
(iii) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the
court reason to believe that he or she is an Indian child.
(iv) The residence or the domicile of the child, his or her bio-
logical parents, or the Indian custodian is known by the court
or is shown to be a predominantly Indian community.
(v) An officer of the court involved in the proceeding has
knowledge that the child may be an Indian child.95
On receipt of information that the child is of Indian ancestry,
the court must notify the parents or Indian custodian and the
Indian child's tribe by either personal service96 or by registered
mail with return receipt requested.97
95. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,586 (1979). The court has no sua sponte duty of investigation
where the child's parents fail to suggest any relationship with an identifiable tribe and
give no positive clues that would lead to discovery of tribal affiliation. In re Adoption of
Crews, 118 Wash. 2d 561, 573, 825 P.2d 305, 312 (1992).
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,588 (1979).
97. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988). If the location or identity of the parent, custodian,
or tribe cannot be determined, notice must then be given to the Secretary of the Interior
who has 15 days to notify the parents, custodian, or tribe. Id. The required notice must
be written in clear language and must include the following information:
(1) the name of the child;
(2) his or her tribal affiliation;
(3) a copy of the document that initiated the proceeding;
(4) the name of the petitioner and the name and address of petitioner's
attorney;
(5) a statement of the right of the biological parents or Indian custodian and
the Indian child's tribe to intervene in the proceedings;
(6) a statement that if the parents or Indian custodians are unable to afford
counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent them;
(7) a statement of the right of the natural parents or Indian custodians and the
Indian child's tribe to have, upon request, 20 days (or more if permitted by
state law) to prepare for the proceeding;
(8) the location, mailing address, and telephone number of the court;
(9) a statement of the right of the parents or Indian custodian or the Indian
child's tribe to petition the court to transfer the proceeding to the Indian child's
tribal court;
(10) the potential legal consequences of the adjudication on future custodial
rights of the parents or Indian custodian; and
(11) a confidentiality statement directed to tribal officials.
44 Fed. Reg. 67,588 (1979). Although individual states are allowed under the Act to
promulgate more stringent notice requirements, the above criteria provide a minimum
notice standard for guidance. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988); see In re Colnar, 52 Wash. App.
37, 40-41, 757 P.2d 534, 536 (holding that a generalized tribal inquiry regarding the
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While the Act mandates tribal notice in involuntary pro-
ceedings, the ICWA is silent about the tribal right to notice in
voluntary custody actions. The legislative history of the Act
implies that this was an explicit choice made by Congress. 98
However, the Act does specifically direct state courts to respect
parental requests for confidentiality in voluntary placements. 99
By implication, tribal notice is stymied in these proceedings.
Traditionally, the requirement to respect parental confi-
dentiality has been relied on by courts when denying tribal noti-
fication rights in voluntary parental termination
proceedings. 10 0 Nonetheless, a state may, in its discretion,
adopt guidelines encouraging such tribal notification while not
forsaking parental anonymity. 10 Such guidelines promote tri-
bal security and, so long as parental confidentiality is respected,
should be strongly encouraged.
b. Intervention Provisions
The ICWA explicitly states that the Indian child's tribe or
Indian custodian shall have a right to intervene "at any point"
during any state court proceeding for the foster care placement
or termination of parental rights. 0 2 Because this broad lan-
guage does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
custody proceedings, the ICWA arguably allows intervention in
both situations. 10 3 However, the Act does distinguish "termina-
ancestry of a parent is insufficient, by itself, to constitute tribal notice under the ICWA),
review denied, 111 Wash. 2d 1023 (1988).
98. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62-65 (1978) (testimony of Chief Calvin Isaac, Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians).
99. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988).
100. See Catholic Social Servs., Inc. v. CA-A., 783 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Alaska 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 948 (1990); In re Adoption of Crews, 60 Wash. App. 202, 213-15,
803 P.2d 24, 31-32 (1991) afld, 118 Wash. 2d 561, 825 P.2d 305 (1992).
101. See, e.g., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, chs. 6.95, 8.05, 8.45.
For example, under the Manual, disclosure of confidential information to an authorized
tribal or Indian organization representative is conditioned upon the following: (1) a
federal, state, or tribal court order that requires an authorized disclosure; (2) a federal,
state, or tribal court order that requires or authorizes disclosure; (3) a written consent
by the subject of the confidential information authorizing disclosure; or (4) a contractual
agreement between the Department of Child and Family Services and a tribe or an
Indian organization under which disclosure is necessary for the performance of agreed
services. Id. ch. 4.05.
102. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
103. See Hollinger, supra note 13, at 462.
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tion of parental rights"' °4 and "adoptive placements,"10 5 and
only allows intervention by right in the former case.' While
the relevant House Committee report does not explain the
rationale behind this distinction, 10 7 the adoption exclusion indi-
cates implicit Congressional recognition that terminations and
adoptions might be more effectively handled in separate
actions. -08
Although the ICWA does not explicitly grant intervention
by right in adoption proceedings, a court may nonetheless allow
discretionary tribal intervention in such actions. 10 9 A court
allowing such discretionary tribal intervention does not circum-
vent the ICWA because the Act is silent on this matter.110
Given the Act's intent to promote the stability of Indian tribes
and Indian families and the unique values of Indian culture,-"
such discretionary intervention arguably furthers the Congres-
sional purpose behind the Act. Thus, discretionary intervention
provides a court with a powerful tool by which to protect essen-
tial tribal interests and to further the policy goals of the ICWA.
4. Remedial Services Requirements
In an involuntary Indian child custody proceeding under
the Act, the petitioning party must demonstrate to the court
that active efforts were unsuccessful in preventing the breakup
of the Indian family." 2 These efforts must include remedial
services and rehabilitative efforts to prevent such a breakup.
113
Further, the petitioning party must try to use the resources of
the child's extended family and tribe in assisting the family to
function as a successful home for the child.1 14 Although the Act
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(ii) (1988).
105. Id. § 1903(1)(iv).
106. See In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 15 (Alaska 1984) (holding that there is no right of
tribal intervention under the ICWA in adoption proceedings).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-46, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530-68.
108. See, e.g., J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 14 (distinguishing terminations of parental rights
and adoptions).
109. Id. at 16; In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983).
110. J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 16.
111. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
112. Id. § 1912 (d).
113. Id.
114. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,592 (1979); see also In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1990) (allowing state to terminate Indian mother's parental rights when state had
offered services to the extended family).
1993] 117
118 University of Puget Sound Law Review
provides only skeletal guidance on this matter, the inclusion of
a remedial effort requirement does provide a baseline review of
hasty removals of Indian children while allowing the states to
develop plans tailored to the needs of their region." 5
The statute is unclear, however, as to when a showing of
unsuccessful remedial services is required, stating only that the
showing must be made by any party "seeking to effect" the
involuntary custody procedure. 1 16 Although the Act's policy of
strengthening tribal and Indian family security would indicate
that the remedial services showing be made before removal of
the child, courts have interpreted the ICWA remedial provision
to require a showing only at a hearing on the merits of a foster
care placement or parental rights termination action."
7
This judicial construction of the ICWA's remedial services
provision is unduly narrow. The phrase "seeking to effect" is
ambiguous, and thus, it is a court's duty to adopt a reasonably
liberal construction that furthers the manifest purpose of the
legislature." 8 Where the intent of the legislature is clear, the
court is governed by it, despite the court's preference for an
alternative choice of language." 9 The Congressional intent
behind the ICWA is clearly and explicitly stated within the
Act. 120 Courts must thus construe the vague "seeking to effect"
language in harmony with this explicit intent. In so doing, a
court should find that the showing of unsuccessful remedial
services must be made before removal of the child.
5. Expert Witness Requirements
Under the ICWA, involuntary foster care placement of an
Indian child cannot be ordered unless there is clear and con-
vincing evidence that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emo-
tional or physical harm to the child.' 2 ' While the burden of
proof for termination of parental rights is the more stringent
115. See, e.g., INDIAx CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, ch. 5.35.
116. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988).
117. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Or. Ct. App.),
review granted, 693 P.2d 48 (Or. 1984), and review dismissed, 701 P.2d 1052 (Or. 1985).
118. See State v. Rinldes, 49 Wash. 2d 664, 667, 306 P.2d 205, 207 (1957).
119. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Public Employment Relations Comm., 110 Wash. 2d
114, 118, 750 P.2d 1240, 1241 (1988); Roza Irrigation Dist. v. State, 80 Wash. 2d 633,
641, 497 P.2d 166, 171 (1972).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
121. Id. § 1912(e).
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beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 122 both involuntary foster
care and termination actions require testimony by "qualified
expert witnesses" to establish the threat of physical or emo-
tional danger to the child.'12  Although the court is allowed dis-
cretion in the matter, persons with the following characteristics
are most likely to fulfill the ICWA requirements:
(1) a member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by
the tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as
they pertain to family organization and child rearing
practices;
(2) a lay expert witness having substantial experience in the
delivery of child and family services to Indians and extensive
knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and
childrearing practices within the Indian child's tribe; or
(3) a professional person having substantial education and
experience in the area of his or her specialty. 124
Thus, the phrase "qualified expert witnesses" is meant to
require expertise beyond the usual social worker qualifica-
tions. 125 Consequently, even experienced social workers are not
qualified experts under the ICWA if they do not possess special-
ized tribal, social, or cultural knowledge. 126 However, courts
have made an exception to this "specialization" requirement
where cultural bias is not implicated in the witnesses' testi-
mony.127 According to the courts' rationale, Congress sought to
resolve the problem of cultural bias via the ICWA provision. If
122. Id. § 1912(f).
123. Id. Although the Act refers to "witnesses," a court has held that the ICWA
requirements may be met when only one qualified expert testifies. In re Roberts, 46
Wash. App. 748, 755, 732 P.2d 528, 533 (1987).
124. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,593 (1979).
125. In re Fisher, 31 Wash. App. 550, 553, 643 P.2d 887, 888 (1982). But see State
ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793, 798-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
where cultural bias is clearly not implicated, the expert witnesses do not need to possess
special knowledge of Indian life), review denied, 717 P.2d 1182 (Or. 1986).
126. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1359-60 (Or. Ct. App.),
review granted, 693 P.2d 48 (Or. 1984), and review dismissed, 701 P.2d 1052 (Or. 1985).
127. Long v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 527 So. 2d 133, 136 (Ala. Civ. App.
1988) (finding that because the children in question neither lived on an Indian
reservation nor practiced an Indian lifestyle, no cultural bias was involved so as to
disqualify expert testimony by the agencies' non-Indian witness as to the threat of
emotional and physical harm to the children); In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 868 (Okla. 1988)
("[W]here cultural bias is clearly not implicated, expert witnesses who do not possess
special knowledge of Indian life may provide the necessary proof that continued custody
of the child by the parent will result in serious emotional or physical harm to the
child."); Tucker, 710 P.2d at 799 ("When cultural bias is clearly not implied, the
necessary proof may be provided by expert witnesses who do not possess special
knowledge of Indian life.")
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no cultural bias is evident, the ICWA strictures can be loosened
to allow for "expert witnesses who do not possess special knowl-
edge of Indian life."' 28
This exception, however, is unduly broad and could serve to
undermine the purposes of the Act. Because the state court
determines whether cultural bias is present in a witness' testi-
mony, there is a real risk that the determination could be made
in a cursory manner, with no real examination of the facts of
the case. This exception has so far been fairly applied where
the Indian children in question neither lived on a reservation
nor practiced an Indian lifestyle, 29 or where parental mental
illness threatened a child's safety. 130 Nonetheless, the excep-
tion's broad wording makes it applicable in a variety of situa-
tions, many of which could be threatening to Indian social and
cultural autonomy. Revised federal BIA guidelines and com-
mentaries are thus needed to, at a minimum, narrow and
explicitly define the scope of this judicial exception to protect
the unique values of Indian culture and promote Indian tribal
and familial stability.
6. Placement Preferences
Under the ICWA, any adoptive, preadoptive, or foster care
placement of an Indian child under state law must adhere to
specific placement preferences. 131 Absent good cause to the con-
trary, a court must give preference in adoptive placements to
placing the child with "(1) a member of the child's extended fam-
ily; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other
Indian families."'3 2
Similarly, preference in foster care or preadoptive place-
ment is to be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
to the following:
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the
Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an author-
ized non-Indian licensing authority; or
128. Tucker, 710 P.2d at 799.
129. Long, 527 So. 2d at 136.
130. Tucker, 710 P.2d at 799.
131. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
132. Id.
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(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or
operated by an Indian organization which has a program
suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.
133
These placement preferences are not absolute. For exam-
ple, the Indian child's tribe may adopt a resolution altering the
order of foster, preadoptive, or adoptive care preferences.'" 4
The chosen tribal preference order must then be followed by
state courts and agencies so long as the chosen placement is the
least culturally restrictive setting appropriate to the child's
needs.1 35  In addition, while the ICWA favors Indian place-
ments, the Act permits placement with a non-Indian family
when placement in an Indian preference situation is not possi-
ble. 136 Likewise, a court may consider the parents' or child's
preference in applying the placement preference require-
ments. 137 Thus, if a consenting parent desires anonymity, the
court or agency must give weight to this desire when applying
the preferences. 38 Because the Act does not define how much
weight should be given to confidentiality concerns, the court
conceivably could entirely disregard placement possibilities
with members of the Indian child's extended family or tribe.
Most commonly, the Act's placement preferences are not
binding where good cause exists to abandon the listed prefer-
ences. 139 Good cause must be based, however, on one or more of
the following factors:
(i) [t]he request of the biological parents or the child when
the child is of sufficient age.
(ii) [t]he extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the
child as established by the testimony of a qualified expert
witness.
(iii) [t]he unavailability of suitable families for placement
after a diligent search has been completed for families meet-
ing the preference criteria. 140
133. Id. § 1915(b).
134. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,594 (1979); see also NAvAJo TRUB. CODE tit. 7, § 615(b) (1987)
("[Tihe Navajo tribe neither favors nor disfavors adoption of Navajo children by persons
who are not members of the Navajo tribe, but states as its policy that each case shall be
considered individually on its own merits by the Tribal Court of the Navajo Tribe.").
135. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,594 (1979).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.
137. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 1915(a).
140. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,594 (1979).
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Many Indians argue that agencies and courts frequently
construe good cause liberally so as to depart from the Act's
placement preferences, thereby undermining the Act's explicit
promotion of Indian culture and community stability. 141
Indeed, in many instances, ICWA placement preferences are
simply ignored by the responsible state agency.' 42 Therefore, it
is essential that state agencies and legislatures directly address
this undercutting of the ICWA and adopt clear, culturally sensi-
tive preference checklists that mandate agency compliance with
the Act's placement policies and standards.
143
7. Emergency Removal Provisions
No provision of the ICWA is to be construed as precluding
the emergency removal or foster placement of an Indian child
domiciled on a reservation when such action is necessary to pre-
vent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. 144 Emer-
gency removal of the child must terminate, however, as soon as
it is no longer necessary. 145 Absent extraordinary circum-
stances, removal cannot continue for more that ninety days
without a court determination. Such a determination must be
supported by expert testimony and clear and convincing evi-
dence that continued custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or phys-
ical damage to the child.
146
Although the Act on its face applies only to children domi-
ciled on the reservation, at least one court has interpreted the
emergency removal authority as extending to nonreservation
children as well. 147 Undoubtedly, the Act's drafters did not
intend to deny nonreservation children such emergency protec-
tion. 148 BIA commentary or guidelines addressing this issue
would help dispel any ambiguity in this area.
141. See Hollinger, supra note 13, at 499.
142. See, e.g., JAMEs, supra note 41, at 19-20.
143. See, e.g., id. at 29; INDIAN CILD WELFARE MANuAL, supra note 10, chs. 7.05-
7.35, 8.25-8.65, 11.85-11.89.
144. 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (1988).
145. Id.
146. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,589-90 (1979).
147. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 n.2 (Or. Ct. App.),
review granted, 693 P.2d 48 (Or. 1984), and review dismissed, 701 P.2d 1052 (Or. 1985).
148. See id.
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8. Right to Counsel
Under the Act, a Indian child's parent or Indian custodian
has the right to be represented by counsel in any involuntary
placement or termination custody proceeding.149 If the parent
or Indian custodian is indigent, court appointment of counsel,
either under state law or ICWA guidelines, is expressly required
by the Act. 150 A court's failure to appoint counsel, even where
none has been requested, has been deemed reversible error.151
The Act, however, fails to clearly indicate when counsel
must be appointed. While the requirement to appoint counsel
depends on an initial determination that the Act applies to the
proceeding and an indigent parent or Indian custodian, no fur-
ther guidance is given in the Act.1 52 Some courts have indicated
that appointment is appropriate under the ICWA as soon as
indigence is determined. 153 Because the Act's policy attempts
to minimize the removal of Indian children from their families
and culture, it is implicit that that goal must be achieved in a
manner that promotes predictability and ensures due process
for all concerned parties. 5 4 Federal guidelines that indicate
when appointed counsel is required would thus promote due
process and allow for needed uniformity and predictability in
custody proceedings.
9. Parental Consent and Consent Withdrawal Provisions
Consent to voluntary termination of parental rights or vol-
untary foster care placement under the Act must be executed in
writing and recorded before a court of competent jurisdiction.155
This consent must be accompanied by a court certificate stating
that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully
149. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1988).
150. Id.; see also In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981) (holding that the
appointment of counsel in the case of an indigent parent is mandatory).
151. M.E.M., 635 P.2d at 1317.
152. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1988).
153. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Or. Ct.
App.), review granted, 693 P.2d 48 (Or. 1984), and review dismissed, 701 P.2d 1052 (Or.
1985). In Charles, Indian parents were furnished separate counsel on the day that their
affidavit of indigency was filed, nearly a month prior to the foster care placement
hearing, thus fulfilling the ICWA requirement that counsel be appointed as soon as
indigent status is determined. Under these circumstances, the court determined that
the parents suffered no prejudice because of the timing of counsel appointment. Id.
154. See In re G.L.O.C., 668 P.2d 235, 238 (Mont. 1983) (holding that one of the
purposes of the ICWA is to afford due process to all parties).
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1988).
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explained in the parent or the Indian custodian's primary lan-
guage and that the terms and consequences were fully under-
stood.15 6 In addition, any consent given prior to, or within ten
days after, the Indian child's birth is automatically invalid.'
57
In the case of voluntary foster care placement, a parent or
Indian custodian may withdraw consent at anytime, and upon
such withdrawal, the child will be returned to him or her.'5 8
However, parental consent to termination of parental rights or
adoption may only be withdrawn by the parent prior to the
entry of a final decree of voluntary termination or adoption.' 59
Unlike an involuntary proceeding, the consensual relinquish-
ment of parental rights does not involve a contest between the
parent and the state. As a result, at least one court has held
that there is no state action in a voluntary termination proceed-
ing to trigger due process concerns. 160 Unless fraud or duress is
proved, a court entering a final termination decree permanently
cuts off all parental rights in the child.' 6 ' Even where fraud or
duress is proved, an adoption that has been effective for more
than two years may not be invalidated under the ICWA unless
state law specifically provides for such invalidation.1
2
Although this two-year deadline is consistent with the
strong public interest in the finality of adoption proceedings,
63
stability in Indian child placement "cannot be the sole yardstick
by which the legality of a particular custodial arrangement is
judged."'6 4 Such a standard would reward those who obtain
custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and would maintain
custody during any ensuing litigation. 65 The absolute two-year
cutoff to adoptive withdrawals involving fraud or duress under-
cuts the ICWA's commitment to promote the stability and secur-
ity of tribes and Indian families. While the validity of some
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1913(b).
159. Id. § 1913(c).
160. In re Adoption of Crews, 118 Wash. 2d 561, 574, 825 P.2d 305, 312 (1992).
161. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1988).
162. Id.
163. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl KL, 26 Wash. App. 897,905-06,615 P.2d 1310,
1315-16 (1980) (holding that there is a strong public interest in the finality of adoption
proceedings), review denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1003 (1981).
164. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 971-72 (Utah 1986); see also Navajo
Nation v. Dist. Ct. for Utah City, 831 F.2d 929 (1987) (affirming a district court's
decision that the decision by the Utah Supreme Court in Halloway mooted the
jurisdictional question in federal court).
165. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 972.
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permanent divestiture date is not argued, a case-by-case bal-
ancing approach allowing for extensions of the current two-
year termination date is an improvement that would help pre-
serve the Act's cultural and social goals.
III. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE IN WASHINGTON STATE:
ONE APPROACH
A. "Public Law 280": Jurisdiction in Washington State
In the 1950s, federal policy toward Indians became domi-
nated by a termination based philosophy that stressed the
destruction of tribal autonomy and sovereignty. 166 On August
1, 1953, Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108,167
which formally announced this policy and declared an end to
federal supervision over tribes and their individual members in
the states of California, Florida, New York, and Texas. 168 Two
weeks later, Congress enacted Public Law 280.169
Public Law 280 was designed to further federal termination
goals and to deal with "the problem of lawlessness on certain
Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institu-
tions for law enforcement." 17 0 To further these policy prefer-
ences, Public Law 280 granted five states outright jurisdiction
over Indian reservations within their borders and authorized
other states to either enact legislation or amend their constitu-
tions to assume jurisdiction over Indian lands. 7'
At the time of Public Law 280's enactment, Washington
had a constitutional disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian land
within state borders.
166. WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 25-28 (2d ed. 1988);
1 NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSN.: JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN:
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW 280 UPON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS 21-22 (1974) [hereinafter JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN]; see also
Rebecca L. Robbins, Self Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present, and
Future of American Indian Governance, in THE STATE OF NATIvE AMERICA: GENOCIDE,
COLONIZATION AND RESISTANCE 98-100 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992).
167. H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
168. Id.
169. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
170. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976).
171. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2, 6, 67 Stat. 588, 590. The five
states included California, Minnesota (all but the Red Lake reservation), Nebraska,
Oregon (all but the Warm Springs reservation) and Wisconsin. Id. Alaska was added to
this list on statehood in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 1, 72 Stat. 545,
545.
1993]
126 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that
they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated
public lands lying within the boundaries of this state, and to
all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian
or Indian tribes and that until the title thereto shall have
been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be
and remain subject to the disposition of the United States,
and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute juris-
diction and control of the Congress of the United States.'7 2
It would appear that the exercise of state jurisdiction over
Indian lands directly violates this constitutional mandate.
Indeed, a U.S. Senate Committee believed that Washington
would have to amend its constitution before the state could
exercise jurisdiction within the borders of Indian reserva-
tions.' Nonetheless, in 1959 the Washington Supreme Court
construed Public Law 280 as authorizing the assumption of
state jurisdiction merely through legislative action. 174 Citing
an earlier case construing a different portion of Article XXVI,
the court noted that the state legislature alone was able to
affect or accomplish the "consent of the people" of Washing-
ton.' 7 5 Article XXVI, which was enacted in compliance with the
State Enabling Act of 1889,176 requires the consent of Congress
and the people of Washington to change jurisdictional control
over Indian lands. The court reasoned that because Congress
gave its consent with the passage of Public Law 280, the state
legislative enactment alone was sufficient to extend state juris-
diction over reservation lands. 177
The above litigation was a direct result of Washington's
first exercise of Public Law 280 jurisdiction over Indian lands.
In 1957, the Washington Legislature enacted statutory provi-
sions that obligated the state to exercise civil and criminal juris-
diction over any Indian reservation within the state at the
request of the affected tribe.'17  Such jurisdiction was not to
172. WASH. CONST. art. XXVI, § 2 (emphasis added).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953), reprinted in 1953
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2408, 2412.
174. State v. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d 789, 337 P.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 898
(1959).
175. Id. at 793, 337 P.2d at 36.
176. State Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, § 1, 25 Stat. 676, 676.
177. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d at 792, 337 P.2d at 36.
178. Act of Mar. 23, 1957, ch. 240, 1957 Wash. Laws 941 (codified as amended at
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 37.12.010-.070 (1992)).
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apply over trust property or over hunting and fishing rights pro-
tected by treaty.1
79
Under this 1957 enactment, state jurisdiction was
extended, by tribal request, over nine reservation based tribes
in Washington. 8 0 These tribes consisted of the Chehalis,
Muckelshoot, Nisqually, Quileute, Quinault, Skokomish,
Swauxin Island, Suquamish, and Tulalip. 181
In 1963, the federal termination policy gained strength in
Washington with the passage of Chapter 36, Laws of 1963.182
One of the most significant features of the amendment was the
imposition of total criminal and civil jurisdiction over reserva-
tion fee lands and trust and allotment lands involving non-Indi-
ans. 8 3 Another significant feature was the imposition of state
jurisdiction in eight specific subject areas, including domestic
relations, juvenile delinquency, adoption proceedings, and
dependent children.184 Tribal consent was irrelevant for this
exercise of state jurisdiction.' 85
A savings clause in the 1963 amendment expressly
retained state jurisdiction over the nine tribes that committed
to such jurisdiction under the earlier 1957 statute. 8 6 Two addi-
tional tribes, the Colville and the Swinomish, requested juris-
diction under the new law.187 Pursuant to a procedural change
from the 1957 statute, 18 8 the Colville only requested the exten-
sion of criminal jurisdiction over their reservation.8 9
As with the 1957 statute, the 1963 amendment was quickly
challenged in court. 190 In one seminal case, the enforceability of
state motor vehicle laws on the reservation was challenged by
the nonconsenting Makah tribe.' 9 ' The basis of the Makah's
argument was threefold. First, the method employed by the
179. Id.
180. See JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 166, at 37, 78-81.
181. Id.
182. Act of Mar. 13, 1963, ch. 36, 1963 Wash. Laws 346 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 37.12.010-.060 (1992)).
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1992). Allotment land is land apportioned to
individual Indians under the Dawes General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
184. See WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1992).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. JUSTICE AND THE AMEIcAN INDIAN, supra note 166, at 38.
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.021 (1992).
189. JUSTICE AND THE AmEfIcAN INDIAN, supra note 166, at 38.
190. Id.
191. Makah Indian Tribe v. State, 76 Wash. 2d 485, 457 P.2d 590 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 397 U.S. 316 (1970).
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state in assuming jurisdiction over their tribe violated both the
state's enabling act and the state constitution.1 9 2 Second, the
method employed by the state in assuming jurisdiction over
their tribe violated Public Law 280.193 Third, Public Law 280
does not permit the extension of only partial jurisdiction over
their tribe and its lands. 9 Relying primarily on prior Wash-
ington case law, the court found for the state on all three points,
further affirming the validity of the 1963 amendment.195
The issue of the validity of the 1963 amendment finally
reached the United States Supreme Court in Washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation.
1 96
In Yakima Indian Nation, the Court upheld the 1963 amend-
ment. 197 The Court concluded that the state's partial assump-
tion of jurisdiction was authorized under section 7 of Public
Law 280,198 which permitted optional states to assume jurisdic-
tion in such a manner as the people of the state, by legislative
action, bound themselves to assume. 199 The Court reasoned
that because Public Law 280 was intended to facilitate, not
impede, the transfer of jurisdictional responsibility to the
states, disclaimer states are not expressly required to amend
their constitutions to effectively accept jurisdiction under Public
Law 280.200 Whether a state constitutional amendment is
required is a matter of state law.20 1 Because the Washington
Supreme Court previously determined that state legislative
action is sufficient to accomplish "the consent of the people" for
192. Id. at 489, 457 P.2d at 592.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 492, 457 P.2d at 594.
195. Id. at 491, 457 P.2d at 594. It is unclear, however, whether the court fully
comprehended the Makah's position. Indeed, Justice McGovern noted the following:
If the (Makah) tribe of Indians feels aggrieved because state jurisdiction is not
presently being exerted to the full extent possible under Chapter 36, all it has
to do is provide the governor with a tribal resolution of the kind called for in
section five of that Act .... A governor's proclamation would necessarily follow,
and a full exertion of state jurisdiction would be achieved.
Id. at 492, 457 P.2d at 594.
196. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
197. Id. at 484.
198. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590.
199. Yakiima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 495. Optional states were states that did
not contain constitutional disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands and that could
legislatively exercise the option of assuming jurisdiction over such lands within their
borders. See id. at 473.
200. Id. at 482. Disclaimer states were states that contained constitutional
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purposes of amending Article XXVI of the Washington State
Constitution,2 °2 the Supreme Court found that Washington had
complied with Public Law 280's procedural requirements.20 3
Washington's assumption of jurisdiction over Indian lands was
thus preserved.
B. Washington State Indian Child Welfare Laws
1. The Washington Administrative Code
With the assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction over
state Indian lands, the Washington Legislature and state
administrative agencies were free to enact statutes and rules
governing Indian child welfare, both on and off reservation
lands. In 1976, two years prior to Congressional adoption of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, the state held public meetings with
various state Indian groups to assess the desirability of pro-
posed statewide administrative rules governing Indian child
welfare. 20 4 Following public meetings in the towns of Toppen-
ish, Spokane, Bellingham, and Seattle,20 5 Washington Adminis-
trative Code (WAC) provisions were promulgated to "ensure
protection of the Indian identity of Indian children, their rights
as Indian children, and the maximum utilization of available
Indian resources for Indian children."20 6
These provisions were ambitious, with a broad definition of
the term "Indian" that encompassed (1) children enrolled in a
recognized tribe and children eligible for enrollment in a recog-
nized tribe, (2) Canadian Indian children, and (3) unenrolled
children who are recognized as Indian by a recognized tribe or
an urban Indian or Alaskan Native community organization.20 7
In addition, the WAC provisions paralleled the later ICWA, both
through their mandatory consideration of tribal culture and
religious identity208 and their placement preferences for Indian
202. State v. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d 789, 794, 337 P.2d 33, 37, appeal dismissed, 361
U.S. 898 (1959); see also Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648, 653 (9th
Cir. 1966) (stating that in Public Law 280, Congress manifested the consent necessary
for state assumption of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967).
203. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 484.
204. See WASH. ADmN. CODE BULL. No. 157 (Oct. 15-31, 1976).
205. Id.
206. WAH. ADn m. CODE § 388-70-600 (1992); see id. §§ 388-70-091 to -095.
207. Id. § 388-70-091.
208. Id. § 388-70-093(3).
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child foster care.20 9 The 1976 WAC provisions also expressly
affirmed tribal sovereign authority.
210
Seeking to effectuate policy change on a local level, the
1976 WAC provisions provided for the organization of Local
Indian Child Welfare Advisory Committees (LICWACs).2 11 The
stated purposes of these ad hoc advisory committees include the
following:
(1) [t]o promote relevant social service planning for Indian
children.
(2) [t]o encourage the preservation of the Indian family,
tribe, heritage, and identity of each Indian child served by the
department of social and health services (DSHS).
(3) [t]o assist in obtaining participation by representatives of
tribal governments and Indian organizations in departmental
planning for Indian children for whom the department has a
responsibility. 21
2
LICWACs were designed to work hand-in-hand with local
Child and Family Services offices.2 13 Under the WAC,
LICWACs must consist of representatives, designated by tribal
governments and urban Indian organizations, who are knowl-
edgeable about the needs of both children in general and the
particular needs of Indian children residing in a service area.2 14
In alleviating, the needs of these children, the LICWACs per-
form the following functions:
(1) assisting DSHS staff in cooperative planning for
Indian children;
(2) consulting DSHS staff regarding the provision of
adoption, foster care, and child protective services on
behalf of Indian children;
(3) reviewing Indian child situations;
(4) assisting in the implementation of recommended
plans;
209. Id. § 388-70-093(4).
210. Id. § 388-70-092 provides as follows:
Neither the licensing of Indian foster homes nor the placement and supervision
of Indian children within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation,
shall in any way abridge the sovereignty of an Indian nation or tribe nor shall
compliance with these rules and regulations be deemed a relinquishment of
sovereign authority by an Indian nation or tribe or by the State of Washington.
211. Id. §§ 388-70-600 to -640.
212. Id.
213. See INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, chs. 10.02, 10.05.
214. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-70-610(1) (1990).
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(5) assisting in the recruitment of and recommenda-
tions regarding the licensing of foster and adoptive
homes for Indian children;
(6) requesting the Economic and Social Services Office
(ESSO) administrator to initiate reviews of casework
decisions that the committee believes to be detrimental
to the best interests of Indian children; and
(7) advising the regional administrator and the ESSO
administrator regarding the department's implementa-
tion and monitoring of the rules related to foster care,
child protection, and adoption services to Indian chil-
dren and their families.2 15
In providing these services, however, the LICWACs must
abide by both statutory2 16 and administrative rules of
confidentiality. 217
Following the death of Eli Creekmore, a three-year old
Indian boy beaten to death by his natural father, the Washing-
ton Indian Child Welfare Action Consortium (WICWAC) was
formed as an umbrella organization to oversee and unite all
LICWACs in Washington.1 8 WICWAC has become a major
advocate for Indian child welfare in Washington. 219 Despite its
laudable goals, however, the LICWAC and WICWAC system
functions properly only if caseworkers and local agencies notify
the appropriate LICWAC of cases involving Indian child custody
issues. While the LICWAC notification system was strength-
ened by WAC revisions in 1989,220 current studies of the Indian
Child Welfare Programs in the Spokane region indicate that the
notification and referral of cases to the local LICWAC has been
occurring infrequently at best.22 ' Addressing these concerns,
the recent Washington State Indian Child Welfare Manual
devotes an entire chapter to the policy, purposes, and functions
of the LICWAC system.222 Included within this chapter are
both a delineation of cases mandating LICWAC review and a
215. Id. § 388-70-620.
216. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.04.060 (1992).
217. WASH. ADmiN. CODE § 388-70-640 (1992).
218. See REVIEw OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, supra note 41, at iii. The local
LICWAC received inadequate information about the family situation from a caseworker
who "wanted to save the family." See State v. Creekmore, 55 Wash. App. 852, 783 P.2d
1008 (1989), review denied, 114 Wash. 2d 1020, 792 P.2d 533 (1990).
219. See REviEw oF CmLD WELFARE SERVICES, supra note 41, at iii.
220. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-73-044 (1992).
221. See REvIEw OF CILD WELFARE SERVICES, supra note 41, at 7,18, 26.
222. INDIAN CmLD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, ch. 10.01-10.65.
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listing of impasse procedures to follow when the service worker
disagrees with the LICWAC recommendations. 223  Unfortu-
nately, because of the recent release date of the Manual , it is
too soon to discern whether it has had any lasting impact or
made any significant improvements in the functioning of the
LICWAC system. 24
2. The Washington Revised Code
Despite administrative regulations governing Indian child
welfare within the state, the Washington Legislature enacted
no statutes in this area until 1987. During that year, however,
the state legislature passed Senate Substitute House Bill
480,225 a bill relating to Indian child welfare and designed in
part to supplant the 1913 Juvenile Court Law,226 which previ-
ously governed the subject matter.22 v
The 1987 bill amended and added new sections to five
existing provisions of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW).
First, the 1987 bill amended RCW 13.34228 to delineate proce-
dures for obtaining court validation of voluntary consent to
Indian child foster care placement. 229 This addition was neces-
sary to bring state Indian child welfare law in line with the
ICWA requirements.23 ° Under the modified RCW 13.34.245,
consent to foster care placement is invalid unless it is executed
in writing before the court and subsequently filed with the
court. 23 1 The consent must be accompanied by a written court
223. Id. ch. 10.35-10.60.
224. While caseworker training as to the Manual's purpose and substance has been
administratively instigated, as of this writing, any documented effect of the Manual's
release and implementation has yet to be demonstrated. Telephone Interview with Ms.
Charele Ramirez, Indian Services Coordinator, Region IV, DSHS (Jul. 7, 1993);
Telephone Interview with Ms. Ruth Skalbania, Child Protective Services Supervisor,
Native American Unit, King County, Washington (Jul. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Skalbania
Interview].
225. Act of Apr. 23, 1987, ch. 170, 1987 Wash. Laws 561 (codified in scattered
sections of WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 13, 26, 74 (1992)).
226. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, 1913 Wash. Laws 520 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.04 (1992)).
227. The 1913 Juvenile Court Law, as evinced by its colorful language, is markedly
a product of its time. For example, the statute defines the term "dependent child" as
including any child under eighteen who "habitually visits any billiard room or pool
room" or who is found "living or being in any house of prostitution or assignation." Id.
§ 1, 1913 Wash. Laws at 520-22.
228. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34 (1992).
229. See id. § 13.34.245.
230. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1988).
231. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.245(1) (1992).
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certification stating that the terms and consequences of the con-
sent were fully explained to the parents or Indian custodian in
their primary language.232 In addition, any consent given prior
to, or within ten days after, the birth of the child is automati-
cally invalid.233
Any person may file a petition to obtain court validation of
a voluntary consent to foster care placement.2 34 On filing of the
petition for validation, the court clerk must schedule the peti-
tion for a hearing on the court validation no later than forty-
eight hours after the petition has been filed, excluding week-
ends and holidays. 235 Notice of this hearing must be provided
as soon as possible to both the consenting parent or Indian cus-
todian and to DSHS or any other agency that is to assume cus-
tody of the child pursuant to the consent to foster care
placement.236 Reasonable attempts must also be made to notify
the nonconsenting parent or Indian custodian if their identity
and location are known.
23 7
Under the amended RCW 34.13.245, parental or Indian
custodial withdrawal of foster care placement may be under-
taken at any time.238 In such an event, the child must be
returned to the parent or Indian custodian unless the child has
been "taken into custody pursuant to RCW 13.34.050 or
26.44.050, placed in shelter care pursuant to RCW 13.34.060, or
placed in foster care pursuant to RCW 13.34.130. "239 On return
of the child to the parents or Indian custodian, the child's plac-
ing agency that had custody of the child under the consent must
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. § 13.34.245(2). A petition must contain the following:
(1) allegations that a parent or custodian located or residing within the district
wishes to voluntarily consent to foster care placement of an Indian child;
(2) a request for the court to validate consent as provided for in RCW
13.34.245;
(3) the name, date of birth, and residence of the child;
(4) the name and residence of the consenting parent or custodian;
(5) the name and location of the Indian tribe in which the child is a member or
is eligible for membership; and
(6) a determination whether the placement preferences in the ICWA will be
followed.
Id.
235. Id. § 13.34.245(3).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. § 13.34.245(4).
239. Id.
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file written notification with the court and notify the Indian
child's tribe and all other parties to the proceeding.24 °
Second, the 1987 bill amended RCW 26.33,241 the state's
adoption law, to bring the state's adoption procedures into full
compliance with ICWA requirements.24 2 Under the new provi-
sion, consent to Indian child relinquishment or adoption is inva-
lid unless signed by the parent at least ten days after the child's
birth and recorded before a court of competent jurisdiction.2 43 A
hearing on the petition for relinquishment or adoption cannot
be scheduled until at least ten days after the child's birth244 and
notice of the pending hearing must be served on the child's
tribe.24
5
At the hearing, the consenting parent must personally
appear before the court to enter his or her consent on the rec-
ord.246 In addition, the court must certify that the ICWA volun-
tary termination requirements have been fulfilled.2 47 However,
parental rights of a nonconsenting parent, including an alleged
father who has claimed or acknowledged paternity of the child,
can only be terminated if the ICWA parental rights termination
requirements are met.248
Under the amended RCW 26.33, a final decree of adoption
cannot be entered unless the court determines either that the
adoptive parents fit within the ICWA placement preferences or
good cause to the contrary has been shown on the record.2 49
Voluntary consent to Indian child adoption, however, may be
withdrawn at any time prior to entry of this final decree. 250
Consent may also be withdrawn for fraud or duress within two
years of the final decree entry.251
Third, the 1987 bill amended RCW 13.04.030252 to allow
juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over validations of volun-
tary consent to foster care placement under RCW 13.34 and
240. Id. § 13.34.245(5).
241. Id. § 26.33.
242. Act of Apr. 23, 1987, ch. 170, 1987 Wash. Laws 561 (codified in scattered
sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13, 26, 74 (1992)).
243. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.080(3) (1992).
244. Id. §§ 26.33.090(1)-.110(1).
245. Id. § 26.33.090(2).
246. Id. § 26.33.090(3).
247. Id.
248. Id. § 26.33.120(4).
249. Id. § 26.33.240(3).
250. Id. § 26.33.160(g).
251. Id.
252. Id. § 13.04.030.
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relinquishment or adoption consents under RCW 26.33 by the
parents or Indian custodian of an Indian child.253 Such jurisdic-
tion is not available, however, if the parent or Indian custodian
and Indian child are residents of, or domiciled within, the
boundaries of a federally recognized Indian reservation with
exclusive tribal jurisdiction.254
Fourth, the 1987 bill amended RCW 74.13,255 the state's
child welfare services law, to allow the child welfare depart-
ment to purchase foster care services for Indian children in the
custody of a federally recognized tribe or tribally licensed
Indian child placing agency.256 Such custody must be pursuant
to parental consent, tribal court order, or state juvenile court
order and the purchase of such care is subject to the same eligi-
bility and rate of support standards applicable to other children
for whom the department purchases care.257
Finally, the 1987 bill amended RCW 74.15,258 the state
statute concerning agencies for children, expectant mothers,
and the developmentally disabled, in two major ways. First,
exclusions under the term "agency" were expanded to include:
(1) any agency operated by any unit of local, state, or federal
government or an agency located within the boundaries of a fed-
erally recognized Indian reservation, licensed by the Indian
tribe259 and (2) persons who have an Indian child in their home
for purposes of adoption, if the child was placed in the home by
a licensed child placing agency, an authorized public or tribal
agency, or court, or if a placement report has been filed under
RCW 26.33 and approved by the court.260
Second, an entirely new section was added to RCW 74.15,
recognizing the authority of state Indian tribes to license agen-
cies on federally recognized reservations and to receive children
and arrange for their placement in foster care or adoptive
situations.2 6 '
Although the 1987 amendments strengthened the stan-
dards for Indian child welfare in Washington, many issues
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. § 74.13.
256. Id. § 74.13.031(11).
257. Id.
258. Id. § 74.15.
259. Id. § 74.15.20(4X1).
260. Id. § 74.15.20(4)(m).
261. Id. § 74.15.190.
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remain. For example, despite the 1987 bill's expanded notice
requirements, timely tribal notice is a continuing problem.262
Again, the recently issued Washington State Indian Child Wel-
fare Manual is a strong attempt to resolve ambiguities and gaps
in both the RCW and WAC Indian child welfare provisions.263
Because of the Manual's fairly recent release date, however, it
is too soon to determine its lasting effect in alleviating these
problems.
3. Washington State Indian Child Welfare Manual
In 1983, representatives of five Olympic peninsula tribes
gathered in Port Angeles to discuss the problem of statewide
noncompliance with the ICWA. 264 These discussions continued
with input from additional Washington tribes through early
1984.265 By May of 1984, a plan to develop a multitribe Indian
child welfare agreement was endorsed by all ten Olympic tribes,
as well as several other western Washington tribes.266
A final draft of this multitribal agreement was approved by
tribal representatives in May of 1985.267 By September of 1985,
tribal negotiations with the Division of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) began over the agreement.268 After much
effort from both sides, the agreement was modified and final-
ized in August 1987.269 In November of 1987, the agreement
was signed by the governor and was subsequently approved by
twenty Washington tribes.2
This final tribal and state agreement is consistent with and
expands on the ICWA and the Indian child welfare provisions of
the WAC and RCW.271 Such an agreement is nonetheless inef-
fective for substantively promoting federal, state, and tribal
Indian child welfare policy in the absence of implementing
guidelines. As a result, state and tribal representatives imme-
262. See REVIEW OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, supra note 41, at 3.
263. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10.
264. DIVISION OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL
MEMORANDUM FROM MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE TRIBAIJSTATE AGREEMENT
NEGOTIATION TEAM TO TRIBAL LEADERS/INDIAN ORGANIZATIONS/INTERESTED PARTIES
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diately began to develop the Washington State Indian Child
Welfare Manual as part of the plan to implement the state and
tribal agreement.27 2 By February of 1990, the final draft of the
Manual was completed.2 3 The Manual was then adopted by
DSHS as statewide policy, thus extending the agreement's pro-
tections to all Indian children within the state.274 Although the
Manual was formally adopted by DSHS three years ago, its
agency and public release was delayed until September of
1991.275 The Manual's lasting substantive effect on Indian
child welfare practices in Washington thus has yet to be
demonstrated.2
76
As previously discussed, the primary purpose of the Man-
ual is to partially implement the formal agreement negotiated
between the twenty Washington tribes and the state.2 77 In so
doing, the Manual reports existing federal and state Indian
child welfare law and discusses the negotiated state policies for
fulfilling these laws in areas where the ICWA, WAC, and RCW
are vague or incomplete.2 78 Although a detailed discussion of
this lengthy Manual is beyond the scope of this Article, critical
chapters within the Manual delineate federal and state policy
with respect to jurisdiction, 279 voluntary consent to foster care
placement,28 ° voluntary consent to adoption,28 1 placement pref-
erences,28 2 LICWAC policy and function,28 3 and determination
of a child's Indian status.28 4 In addition, the Manual lists spe-
cific sanctions for noncompliance with federal or state Indian
child welfare policy. 285 These mandatory sanctions are
designed to enforce compliance with the ICWA, WAC, RCW, and
the DSHS Manual and range from the issuance of a deficiency
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. But see id. (stating that the DSHS adoption of the Manual does not fully
implement the tribal and state agreement. Indeed, full implementation requires
changes in DSHS policies and regulations).
275. See INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, ch. 1.
276. See Skalbania Interview, supra note 224.
277. See INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 264.
278. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, ch. 15.
279. Id. ch. 6.10-6.17.
280. Id. ch. 6.20-6.28.
281. Id. ch. 6.91-6.910.
282. Id. chs. 7.05-7.70, 8.25-8.70, 11.70-11.76.
283. Id. ch. 10.01-10.65.
284. Id. ch. 11.10-11.14.
285. Id. ch. 1.35.
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report to the revocation of an agency's license.28 6 Adoption of
the Manual does not, however, completely implement the nego-
tiated state and tribal agreement because certain changes in
DSHS policies and regulations are first necessary.28 7
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 1970s, longstanding inequalities in Indian child
foster placement and adoption rates led to efforts to reform
Indian child welfare, both on the federal and state level. The
1978 Indian Child Welfare Act, as well as Washington's legisla-
tive and administrative enactments, have assisted tribal inter-
ests and rectified many of the problems concerning disparate
treatment of Indian children in these areas. Nonetheless, both
the federal Act and the Washington laws suffer from incom-
plete, vague language and serious problems of noncompliance in
the field. Despite the laudable goals of current Indian child
welfare legislation, increased administrative clarification, as
well as methods of enforcing greater local compliance are
needed to protect fully the best interests of Indian children and
to promote the stability of Indian tribes. The Washington State
Indian Child Welfare Manual has attempted to clarify the law
in this area, but more is needed to enforce compliance and to
fully protect Indian children.
286. Id.
287. See INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MANUAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 264.
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